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In April 2007 I began my dissertation towards an MA in Educational Research 
at the University of Sheffield. Entitled ‘An evaluation of the experience of 
doing life history research: A case study’ its purpose was to confirm (or 
otherwise) my ‘hunch’ that life history would allow fidelity to my professed 
research philosophy. I will elaborate on this later but the thinking that underlies 
all my research endeavours is to do feminist research with an ethical aim, a 
moral purpose and a reflexive impetus. I had been introduced to the notion of 
‘narrative research’ in the taught components of the above MA and felt that 
that this was for me. By ‘narrative’ I mean a particular type of discourse, that is 
‘the story’, ‘the type of discourse that draws together diverse events, 
happenings and actions of human lives’ (Polkinghorne, 1996:5). On this 
understanding it dawned on me that I had already unconsciously undertaken 
such research years earlier for an MA in Women’s Studies (Novakovic, 1993) 
but had failed to gra
with oral accounts. 
 So I will first spend some time setting out why I was powerfully drawn to 
doing narrative research. Then I will mark the points where this brought me 
into potential conflict with concerns over research ethics, including a more 
fundamental consideration of the compatibility of narrative research with 
ethical practice. Finally I will sketch out how a life history me
p
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I cannot remember a time when I did not use stories as a medium to make 
sense of the world. It is a practice I learned as a child, listening to the stories 
my parents told and later realising this was how they strove to make sense of 
their experiences, to reconcile who they were (and what they might have 
imagined they would be) with the reality of their lives. I suspect storytelling 
served also to anchor them in a world they, arriving in England from post-war 
Europe, often found alien. As an undergraduate, a linguist and student of 
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use I thought it would be considered 
m
search. As 
lummer observes, ‘stories gather people around them’ (2000:174). 
arrative Research and Ethical Practice 
licit the role of stories as interpretive representations rather than 
literature, my struggles with German history became a more evenly matched 
fight through the reading of stories rather than of the set texts, although I didn’t 
tell anyone that is what I was doing beca
so ewhat ‘lightweight’ and unscholarly. 
 I was also drawn to narrative research through Emihovich’s (1995) 
assertion that narrative can link reason and emotion, as I had at the time begun 
working on a rejection of that particular ‘vicious binary’, as St Pierre 
(1997:176) would call it, a rejection that has been sustained by the work of 
Martha Nussbaum (2001). Nussbaum takes a cognitive/evaluative view of 
emotion, based on close attention to the narrative of experience and 
understands that emotions themselves have a narrative structure and are 
‘cognitively-laden’ (2001:65). Sikes (1997) maintains that telling stories is also 
a fundamental form of human communication and that they ‘let us know we 
are not alone, that other people have gone through the same things and have 
felt like we have’ (1997:23). Telling stories is therefore inherently social, 
which I would say makes it a fitting method in social science re
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Early on in my consideration of the narrative approach I encountered a 
problem. It was not that I was concerned about the suggestions of fiction and 
fabrication inherent in the term ‘story’, although I have never evaded an 
engagement with Phillip’s question ‘will any old story suffice?’ (1994:15). 
Indeed I suggest that narrative’s saving grace here is its potential to broaden 
and deepen the reach of understanding by raising the question ‘what if it were 
true?’, encompassing the possibility of what Goodson and Sikes (2001) call 
‘alternative lives’ and revealing the how narrators actively engage in the 
reshaping of the past in order to align it with the present (Ricoeur, 1991). After 
all, I had heard my parents do this often enough.  Indeed narrative research can 
make exp
records. 
 So this was not my problem. My problem arose out of a consideration of 
research ethics and began with a troubling of notions of (specifically) 
researcher identity. I mentioned at the start of this paper that my research 
philosophy was to do feminist research with an ethical aim, a moral purpose 
and a reflexive impetus. However, it is clear that this may also be read as a 
statement of my researcher identity. Yvonne Downs is someone who does 
feminist research with an ethical aim, a moral purpose and a reflexive impetus. 
By inscribing my researcher identity as words on a page the impression is 
given that it is fixed, stable, knowable and express-able, which in turn relies on 
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 and Smithies (1997) for example 
e but how it is that some 
an
nism for the ‘manifestation 
may be a fundamentally unethical enterprise. It seemed as if my strong 
a rticular Cartesian notion of selfhood. Seeking to understand the interplay 
between race, class and gender led me to a more nuanced understanding. 
 I came to understand that it is possible for the researcher to maintain an 
identity external to the self. This is done by fixing in place an immobile 
‘Other’, using mechanisms such as ‘reflexivity’, ‘giving voice’, and 
‘empowerment’. I am not saying here that the researcher does this knowingly, 
although there is disagreement as to the degree of complicity in the 
employment of these mechanisms (Pillow, 2003). Nor am I suggesting that 
‘Others’ are powerless victims who are all accepting and non-resistant. I am 
arguing that it can be difficult not to constitute your researcher self thus, for to 
do so may involve chafing against established academic and institutional 
norms. It may even be that alternative ways of re-presenting researcher and 
‘researched’ are simply filtered out. Lather
explicitly tried to avoid such ‘fixing’ and had problems getting their research 
on women living with HIV/Aids published. 
 So my problem was growing and now involved a disturbance of some of 
my taken for granted assumptions. For hadn’t the very mechanisms used in 
authorising the researcher self been used by feminists not only in research but 
also to make political claims? However, I could not ignore, for example, 
Skeggs’ robust critique of reflexivity, ‘the telling of research stories’ that ‘not 
only enables the researcher to be identified as ‘real’ but also grants the spurious 
authority of authenticity’ (2002:364). Likewise I came to see that ‘giving 
voice’, which is commonly read as an act of inclusion, also contains notions of 
exclusion. Trinh (1989, 1991) and hooks (2000) argue that it is not so much a 
matter of whether ‘Others’ are silenced or given voic
c  choose to speak (or not), whilst ‘Others’ are allowed to speak or not, or 
indeed as (Skeggs, 2002) argues, are forced to speak. 
 However, I was so far only skirting the foothills of the problem. For it was 
not just in the minutiae and the mechanics of narrative research that the 
problem resided, but in the very heart of narrative research itself. After 
Cosslett, Lury and Summerfield (2000), Skeggs also argues that subjectivity is 
a product of autobiographical practice and does not precede it, that it is the 
‘method that is constitutive of the self, not the self of the researcher that 
always/already exists and can be assumed in research’ (2002:348). More 
specifically, and drawing on the work of Steedman (2000) she also maintains 
that a key method in this process is appropriating the stories of others. Stories 
thus become the intellectual property of the researcher self, a resource that can 
be mobilized for the display of cleverness, a mecha
and maintenance of difference and distinction’ (2002:350) and a way ‘to shore 
up the composite of the academic self’ (2002:361). 
 I cannot overemphasise the degree of my dismay here because the 
inference is that narrative research, turning as it does on the stories others tell, 
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I must say I was not at this point tempted simply to give up on the notion of 
narrative research. All research has the potential to ‘other’, to colonise or to do 
harm. It is patently absurd to stop doing research because of the potential 
challenges it presents. I therefore proceed with life history methodology to 
reconcile, somewhat messily and uneasily, my ethical intentions with my desire 
to do narrative research. I must emphasis that my desire is always to situate 
myself in a wider research context by acknowledging that others do not hold 
the same views as me (Tierney, 2000:539). Nor am I advocating ‘how to do 
ethical narrative research in seven simple
that others may find merit in what I say. 
 So what do I mean by my ethical intentions? Ricoeur describes ethical 
intention as ‘aiming at the “good life” with and for others in just institutions’ 
(1992:172, original emphasis). This is particularly relevant to life history 
research, hinting as it does to a connection between the personal, relational and 
social. My ethical intentions also encompass Bhavnani’s (1993) suggestions 
that feminist research should not re-inscribe those being researched into 
prevailing representations, nor should it valorise or romanticise them, nor 
downplay structural subordination. It should, however, address issues of 
difference throughout the research process and make the micro-political 
processes that suffuse the conduct of research explicit. But the difficulty of 
translating intention into practice was brought home to me by Fine, Weis, 
Weseen and Wong (2000) who write about the challenges of honouring their 
commitment to ethical researc
terrain of real world research. 
 Before I go on to give my account of how I trod this rocky path I will 
outline what I thought life history research was, or should be. I concur with 
Bertaux (1981) that life stories may be contained within life histories but not 
vice versa because life histories are themselves life stories placed within 
broader contexts, the view taken also by Goodson and Sikes (2001). I would go 
further and say that the connections between contexts (plural) and the life lived 
are integral to the story. By contexts I conceive of three non-hierarchical and 
inter-connected dimensions. The first is the (changing) social, political and 
historical circumstances in which the life is lived. Within this broad context are 
‘prevailing discourses’, shaped by and shaping those broader circumstances in 
which they are situated and impacting on the expectations of individuals. Last 
but not least is ‘the script’ (Goodson and Sikes, 2001). Passing through the 
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filter of historical circumstance and prevailing discourse, ‘the script’ influences 
and impacts on the way a person comes to take their place in the world. 
Structural factors such as race, class, gender and ethnicity are variously located 
in and flow between each of these contexts. This conceptualisation thus meshes 
together C. Wright Mills’ (1959) b
blurring of the edges between each. 
 Whilst lives are played out against a background script, it is erroneous to 
conceive of this script as individually authored. The script is instead itself a 
product of broader historical and discursive factors. As Smith argues, ‘how 
people speak of the forms of life in which they are implicated is determined by 
those forms of life’ (1988:188). And Goodson and Sikes contend ‘the life story 
individualizes and personalizes; the life history contextualizes and politicizes’ 
(2001: 87-88). The story is not therefore individually authored but 
‘collaboratively generated’, an outcom
the individual and their circumstances. 
 Thus the garnering of individual stories to authorise oneself as a researcher 
becomes at the very least a slippery enterprise. Indeed Skeggs’ criticism that 
the researcher’s story ‘is based on their identity which is usually articulated as 
a singularity and takes no account of movement in and out of space, cultural 
resources, place, bodies and others but nonetheless authorizes itse
(2
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How then did I translate these understandings into a methodology could serve 
as the lynchpin and touchstone of ethical practice? Dollard (1935), interpreted 
by Polkinghorne (1995) provides useful guidance here and I will therefore 
touch briefly on each of his seven principles, girding each with examples taken 
from the transcripts of two interviews I did with my sister Kris about her 
education and schooling as part of the MA dissertation referred to above. 
(Further discussion of the reasons I identify the participant here can be found in 
Downs 2007. Suffice it to say here, I do not advocate this as a
b
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Dollard’s Principles for the Crafting of a Life History 
 
Attention is paid to the cultural contextual features that give story meaning 
 
The focus here is on ‘values, social rules and meaning systems and languaged 
conceptual networks (and) assumptions about acceptable and expected personal 
goals’ (Polkinghorne, 1995:16). It thus occupies the ground between discourse 
and script. 
 Kris told me how she has always felt constrained by what she saw as 
‘acceptable’ and ‘expected’ even though she knew ‘how to play this game’. 
She also elucidated the personal costs involved in ‘taking different paths’. She 
wonders if her difficulties are due to her ‘personality’. Taking account of 
cultural contexts here offers the possibility of other analyses and 
interpretations. It avoids re-inscribing her into prevailing representations, such 
as ‘deviant’ and/or interpreting her actions as ‘pathological’. 
 
Attention is paid to the embodied nature of the storyteller  
 
I have always seen how we look as an important factor in the unfolding of my 
sister’s life and mine, influencing amongst other things the roles we were 
ascribed within the family. Being placed in binary opposition, ‘the pretty 
one’/’the clever one’ was, we both feel, an influential factor in our subsequent 
trajectories. 
 
Attention is paid to the importance of other people 
 
In both interviews Kris and I refer to the role of others in her life. It was her 
friends who shielded her from the worst of her difficult times at school. Being 
sisters is also a constant reminder of the connections between people but also 
of the limits of their influence and the role of other influential forces/contexts. 
Here the relational aspect of life is also emphasised, mitigating once again the 
possibility of ‘a’ story being appropriated to authorise the researcher. 
 
The storyteller is an actor who alters the scene not a pawn buffeted by events, 
in other words there is interaction between the storyteller and her or his setting 
 
I tell Kris in the interviews that I see her as ‘resourceful’. She also relates that 
‘finding out …….. I’m quite capable’ has made her feel ‘like I’m a 
millionaire’. Therefore, whilst contexts can be constraining, the storyteller is 
not inactive within those constraints. This addresses the charge of determinism 
in life history research and re-casts relativism as a strength. Individuals may 
experience the same events but will not deal with them in the same way. Life 
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history is about how and what happens because of and at the point of this 
interaction. 
 
Attention is paid to social events the storyteller has experienced as a member 
of an historical cohort in the context of understanding how the storyteller 
works to shape a future undetermined by the past 
 
This criterion engages with the interaction between the script and the broader 
historical context focusing on the ‘struggle to change habitual behaviors (sic) 
and to act differently’ (Polkinghorne, 1995:17). Kris never loses sight of her 
membership of an historical cohort and uses the pronoun ‘you’ to intimate 
membership of that group, ‘in those days at school you didn’t talk to parents’. 
Later she uses ‘I’ to indicate how she acted within this context (‘I broke my 
own perception really of how I should be’) to gain what she interprets as 
‘freedom’. She thus disturbs easy distinctions between individual agency and 
circumstances. 
 
The story takes place within a bounded temporal period 
 
This could be the storyteller’s entire life (Chanfrault-Duchet, 1991) or a 
portion of it but the story must have a beginning, a middle and an end. This can 
be more problematic than it first appears. Kris struggled to find a beginning to 
the story of her educational trajectory, and has also complained of ‘too many 
beginnings’ in her life. Women’s lives are also generally more ‘episodic’ than 
this structure allows for (Smith, 1988). Thus whilst there is a need for 
boundaries there is also the need for considering how the particular temporal 
boundaries chosen influence the story itself. 
 
The story has to make ‘sense’ ie. be plausible and understandable 
 
This, for me, addresses Phillip’s question ‘will any story do’. Moreover, a story 
meeting this criterion forges a link between the storyteller and others. For 
example my sister recounted waiting for my mother to wave to her as she 
passed by her classroom window on her first day at school. Despite our very 
different educational stories I also did this and immediately understood that we 
were ‘not so different that we do not recognize each other’ (Mahoney and 
Zmroczek, 1997:5). 
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Ethics and Narrative Research Reconciled? 
 
Whilst the presence of the researcher cannot and should not be forgotten, it is 
not the researcher but the contexts and the individual’s place within and 
negotiation of these contexts that matter. The participant cannot, within this 
conceptualisation, be fixed, because so much is relational. In this respect it 
connects to the ‘relational ethics’ advocated by Ellis (2007). Nor do the stories 
provide warrants for researcher privilege.  Indeed as Goodson and Sikes 
contend there is the potential to disrupt ‘normal assumptions of what is known 
by intellectuals in general and sociologists in particular’ (2001:7). The fact that 
a life history methodology allows for alternative ways of making sense of a life 
other than through the lens of ‘personality’ and individualized response gives 
it, I would argue, the potential to be a profoundly ethical enterprise. 
 However, there is no happy end. That I still have a statement that can be 
read as expressing my researcher identity is not a sign that I have found ‘the 
answer’. I keep it there rather as a ‘prickle under the skin’. It reminds me that 
having some idea of what I am about as a researcher might be necessary, but 
this is and should not be a straightforward matter. 
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